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 Abstract 
 
We estimate rates of time preference using a utility-based choice experiment 
administered to a nationally representative sample of 2,914 respondents.  For the full 
sample, the rate of time preference is very high for immediate benefits and drops off 
substantially thereafter, which is inconsistent with exponential discounting but consistent 
with hyperbolic discounting.  Estimates of the hyperbolic discounting parameter range 
from 0.48 to 0.61.  Visitors to water bodies have low rates of discount but exhibit 
hyperbolic discounting, whereas those who do not visit have consistently high rates of 
discount and low valuations of water quality.   
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Many environmental decisions have significant long-term consequences.  That 
makes the discount rate a prime consideration.  In a policy context, the intertemporal 
preferences of the public will generate political pressures affecting environmental policy 
decisions.  The public’s intertemporal preferences may not reflect an economist’s view of 
rational behavior, as documented in the emerging literature on anomalies in discounting 
behavior.  The more important issue is not whether irrationalities exist, but whether they 
are large and are likely to have consequential effects. 
Our approach departs from the existing literature in several ways.  First, we 
estimate rates of time preference based on a series of environmental policy choices 
administered in a survey context.  Rather than using an experimental structure with a 
small convenience sample, we use a survey methodology that draws on a large nationally 
representative sample.  For this sample, we estimate average and marginal rates of time 
preference and ascertain how these vary with individual characteristics.  Unlike many 
experimental studies that involve modest but real financial stakes, our experimental 
structure utilizes stated preferences, which we subject to a variety of internal validity and 
rationality tests.  
Second, we estimate rates of time preference using a random utility model, 
employing both conditional fixed-effects logit and mixed logit approaches.  These 
estimation approaches incorporate different sets of assumptions; the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives is the most important.  Because our formulations involve estimates 
of discount rates within the context of individual utility levels over time, they invoke a 
theoretically appropriate model of discounted utility. This process is more direct than 
experimental studies that estimate discount rates on money rather than on utility.   
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Third, our study examines the pattern of discount rates for water quality 
improvements over time and evaluates its consistency with exponential discounting and 
hyperbolic discounting approaches.  A principal alternative to exponential discounting is 
the hyperbolic discounting model, which is distinguished from exponential discounting 
by a single parameter β.  When this parameter is less than 1, it characterizes hyperbolic as 
opposed to exponential discounting. 
Section 1 introduces the choice task and describes the national probability-based 
sample.  The environmental good in the choice context is water quality.  The other 
dimensions of the choice are the cost of water quality improvements and the time when 
the improvements will occur.1   
Section 2 presents estimates of a random utility model, a conditional fixed-effects 
logit model, and a mixed logit model.  These models yield information on rates of time 
preference as a function of different periods of delay.  The mixed logit models relax two 
key assumptions of the conditional logit model and permit individual heterogeneity in the 
parameter values.  The two models yield very similar results, showing the results are 
robust.   
In Section 3 we present estimates of the hyperbolic discounting parameter β for 
both the conditional logit and mixed logit cases.  A key finding is that the rates of 
discount and the properties of discount rates for environmental quality differ markedly 
for people who visit lakes, rivers, and streams for recreational purposes and those who do 
not.  Section 4 examines the nature of these differences.  Recreational users of water 
bodies have higher valuations of water quality and lower rates of time preference, but 
                                                 
1 The literature on discount rates for environmental goods and the role of hyperbolic discounting includes 
Horowitz and Carson (1990) and Cropper and Laibson (1999). 
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unlike those who do not use inland water bodies for recreation, they exhibit hyperbolic 
discounting.  Section 4 also explores the influence of other personal characteristics such 
as age.  Section 5 summarizes our results and their implications. 
 
1.  Choice Task and Sample Description 
1.1 Survey Structure 
Our study uses an original survey in which each respondent considered a policy 
choice task such as that presented in Figure 1.  The general research strategy is to elicit 
respondents’ valuations of environmental improvements that would begin after different 
periods of delay.  Before considering the choices, respondents receive detailed 
information on three dimensions of the choices: water quality, cost, and time. 
Respondents make five choices among three policy options, which are defined along 
these three dimensions. Respondents indicate their most preferred choice among the 
different policy alternatives.   
The environmental dimension is the amount of water quality improvement, which 
is the percentage of lakes and rivers in the respondent’s region that the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rates as being “good” for fishing, swimming, 
and quality of the aquatic environment.2  The percentage improvement ranges from 5 
percent to 20 percent.  Each of the policies generates costs ranging from $100 to $400.  
The time dimension in Figure 1 is the year when improvement begins, which we will 
refer to below as time delay.  The amount of time delay before the improvement is 
realized is zero, two, four, or six years.  Because of the relatively short time delays, the 
                                                 
2 The survey included an extensive discussion of water quality based on the approach taken by the U.S. 
EPA (1994) in its National Water Quality Inventory.  See Huber, Viscusi, and Bell (2008) for further 
description. 
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results should not be influenced by how people discount effects that occur after one’s 
death.3  The policy choice decisions involved four different levels of cost, four different 
levels of water quality improvement, and four different periods of time delay.   
The survey design makes it possible to identify the individual’s rate of time 
preference for quality improvements. 4  For each different time delay, the survey permits 
an estimate of how much the respondent would have been willing to give up in terms of 
lower water quality or higher cost to remain just as well off.  The cost dimension of the 
policy choice is not needed to estimate this intertemporal tradeoff rate.  However, 
including cost makes the policy choice more realistic and leads to estimates of the cost-
water quality improvement tradeoff that can be compared with estimates using a different 
survey methodology as an additional validity check.   
 
1.2 Modeling the Effect of Delay 
The costs and water quality improvements had comparable time dimensions, with 
each lasting for five years.  However, costs begin immediately while the benefits begin 
after a period of 0 to 6 years.  Thus the time discounting considers the value in present 
dollars of the level of improvement or of having the improvement come sooner.   To see 
the tradeoff between the present value of costs and improvements, consider the standard 
exponential discounting case with a constant annual discount factor δ.  There is a delay of 
                                                 
3 The choice set led to tradeoffs that were corroborated using quite different survey methodologies.  In 
particular, the water quality-cost tradeoffs were similar to those using a referendum format and an iterative 
paired comparison format.  The choice design was generated using a structure in which alternatives were 
balanced with respect to utility (Huber and Zwerina 1996).  The choice sets are selected to minimize the 
expected magnitude of the variance-covariance of the estimated parameters given prior estimates of these 
parameters.  The designs that emerge avoid dominant options or easy choices but provide more accurate 
parameter estimates. 
4 As an identification check, we also estimated a variety of linear and quadratic specifications reported in 
the Appendix, and the results were robust.  See Rust (1994) for further discussion of identification issues. 
 5 
t years before the improvement begins.  With a delay of t years, the discount factor is δt.  
Let the person’s utility function be additively separable and linear in cost c and water 
quality improvement w, and let the time period of delay be t.5  Then the present value of 
the five year imposition of costs beginning immediately, as described in the survey text, 
is  4321c  .  Similarly, the present value of water quality benefits after a t 
year delay is given by  432t 1w  .  Because the bracketed terms are 
identical, the person’s decision reduces to ascertaining whether the value of c is greater 
than tw .  The value of  r1/1  , where r is the rate of interest.  Thus, 1/(1 + r)t units 
of water quality that will result from improvements begun immediately will be equivalent 
to a unit of water quality improvement begun after a period of t years.  The cost 
imposition will be worthwhile if the utility of the water quality improvement in year t is 
at least as great as (1 + r)t multiplied by the utility of the annual cost.  The fact that the 
costs and improvements occur over a five-year period drops out of the analysis, as the 
bracketed terms in the present value formulas above cancel out when comparing costs 
and benefits. 
We test for the possibility that respondents use hyperbolic discounting rather than 
exponential discounting.  Hyperbolic discounting rates place a greater weight on 
immediate compared to deferred payoffs, inducing patterns of time inconsistency.  
Concerns with time inconsistency and hyperbolic discounting date back to Strotz (1956).  
The widely used quasi-hyperbolic discounting (hereafter merely denoted as “hyperbolic”) 
approach employed by Laibson (1997) is useful because of its analytic simplicity and 
                                                 
5 We also assume that the discount rate is the same for costs and for improvements.  This assumption 
facilitates the theoretical discussion and is the norm in the literature, but it is not essential for the 
interpretation of the empirical results because the cost time stream never varies. 
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clear-cut contrast with the exponential model.  The hyperbolic formulation for discrete 
time periods yields discount factors given by ,...},,,1{ 32  , where 0 < β < 1, and  < 
1.  The discount factor terms involving  are all multiplied by a parameter β except in the 
initial period. The discussion here and below employs discrete rather than continuous 
time because our survey focuses on discrete periods of time. 
Matters become a bit more complicated based on the hyperbolic discounting 
model.  The survey scenario pertains to costs and benefits over a five year period.  The 
present value of the cost stream becomes  4321 c .  If the benefits begin 
immediately, the present value is  4321 w . The policy is attractive if 
the utility of the annual water quality improvement w exceeds the disutility of the annual 
cost.   If there is a time delay of t years, benefits are  4321 tw .  The 
bracketed expression and the β term are present for all nonzero periods of delay.  
Consider the five year stream of water quality improvement deferred by t years that is 
equivalent to the disutility of the five year cost stream that begins immediately.  Let costs 
be multiplied by –1 to reflect the fact that cost c has a negative utility value.  The value of 
w must satisfy 
    432432t βδβδβδβδ1cβδβδβδβδβwδ  , (1) 
or 
 
 
  t432t
432 c1c
w





 . (2) 
Compared to the exponential discounting case, hyperbolic discounting boosts the water 
quality improvement needed to achieve indifference with the utility of the immediate cost 
stream.  This relationship reflects the general phenomenon that hyperbolic discounting 
 7 
differentially reduces the value of all deferred payoffs by a multiplicative parameter β in 
the hyperbolic discounting model.   
 
1.3 Sample Characteristics  
In 2004 a group of almost three thousand respondents participated in our Web-
based valuation survey.  The sample participants were members of the Knowledge 
Networks panel, which is a probability-based panel so that the composition closely 
parallels the U.S. Census statistics.  People who do not have computers are given free 
internet access.  The response rate to our survey is over 75 percent.  As documented in 
Table A1, the demographic profile of our respondent group is remarkably similar to the 
mix of the age 18 and over U.S. population.  We describe the properties of the sample 
and present tests of the survey methodology elsewhere.6   
Although this conjoint survey is not a contingent valuation survey, it is in the 
general family of stated preference surveys.  In the Appendix we report the requisite 
validity tests that have been established for such studies.7  Chief among these tests is a 
series of scope tests to ascertain whether subjects consistently prefer more water quality 
improvement to less and, similarly, whether they prefer lower values of costs and shorter 
delays to higher costs and longer delays.8  The survey included an additional series of 
rationality tests to determine whether subjects made decisions that did not lead to the 
choice of a dominated alternative.  Overall, 95 percent of the original sample, or 2,914 
                                                 
6 Magat, Viscusi, and Huber (2000), Viscusi, Huber, and Bell (2008), and Huber, Viscusi, and Bell (2008) 
describe these other aspects of the survey, including sample attrition and selection effects.  The current 
paper provides the first analysis of the questions pertaining to rates of time preference. 
7 Arrow et al. (1993) discuss the importance of rationality tests as a validation check for stated preference 
surveys. 
8 As emphasized by Heberlein, Wilson, Bishop, and Schaeffer (2005), additional types of scope tests can be 
more informative.  Extensive scope test results are reported in Huber, Viscusi, and Bell (2008), including 
behavioral scope tests and affective scope tests. 
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individual respondents, passed the dominated choice test and therefore constitute the 
sample considered here.9   
The computer-based survey lasted an average of 25 minutes and included detailed 
information pertaining to the meaning of water quality ratings and financial costs.  Each 
respondent considered a series of five policy choice tasks, such as that in Figure 1, so that 
there are 14,570 decisions among the three policies.   
 
2.  Empirical Model and Estimates 
2.1 The Random Utility Model  
To analyze the conjoint decisions we use a random utility model framework.10  
The three utility components are the cost c, the water quality improvement w, and the 
time delay t.  The per unit utilities associated with these components are   for cost, λ for 
water quality, and   for time delay.  The attribute w is positively valued, while cost and 
delay are negatively valued.  Let i denote policy option i and n denote respondent n.  In a 
simple model with only main effects, the utility uni of choice i for respondent n is given 
by 
 ,twcu ninininini   (3) 
where ni is a random error term.  
Our primary focus is on a model that includes an interaction of the water quality 
improvement variable with the time delay to reflect how the respondent discounts water 
quality improvements over time.  Thus, we rewrite the utility as 
 ninininininini twtwcu  . (4) 
                                                 
9 The empirical estimates reported here are very similar to those obtained using the full sample. 
10 For general background, see McFadden (1974) and Train (2003).  
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The probability pni that respondent n chooses option i is given by 
  ijallfor,twtwctwtwcobPrp njnjnjnjnjninininininini  .  (5) 
Delay consequently may reduce utility directly as well as through its effect on 
how improvements are valued.  These interactions will provide estimates of how the 
discount rate for water quality improvements varies with the period of delay.  The 
dominant economic effect that should be exhibited under the standard exponential 
discounting model is a steady exponential decrease in the value of improvements as the 
length of the delay is increased.  Drawing on considerations beyond our model, 
respondents may be averse to delays wholly apart from the effect on discounting of the 
stream of benefits.  For example, delays frequently are signals of uncertainty as to 
whether the policy will take effect.   
Direct effects of personal characteristics do not enter this comparison in equation 
5 since they are common to all choices.  However, our conditional logit estimates of the 
model below will explore the effect of interactions of a vector of personal characteristics 
with each of the main utility components: cni, wni, and tni.  Thus, these interactions will 
explore how attributes such as membership in an environmental organization affect 
preferences over different components.  
The effect of visiting lakes and rivers for recreational purposes will be examined 
in two ways.  First, visitor status is a demographic variable, and it can be included among 
the personal characteristic interactions for estimates based on the full sample.  However, 
visitation of water bodies could also affect the structure of the equation more generally.  
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As a result, we also present estimates for the subsample of respondents who visited a lake 
or river in the past year as well as estimates for those who did not.11   
The conditional fixed-effects logit model imposes two key assumptions.  The 
more restrictive assumption is that the random components within each subject are not 
correlated, which leads to the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives.  A 
second key assumption is that the variation in preferences is captured by observed 
respondent characteristics included in the model.  Below we present comparative results 
based on a mixed logit framework that relaxes the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption and permits there to be unobserved heterogeneity in tastes.    
 
2.2 Conditional Logit Estimates 
Because the delay variable can take on only three nonzero values of two (Delay 
2), four (Delay 4), and six (Delay 6) years of delay, we examine a discrete variable 
specification for each of these delay periods.  The Appendix presents sensitivity tests 
using other formulations.  The model that captures the full range of the time dimensions 
in the survey is given by   
 nini3ni2ni1nininini 6Delayw4Delayw2Delaywtwcu  . (6) 
The first column of conditional logit results in Table 1 indicate that the effect on 
the utility of improvements of a two-year delay is more than half the effect of a six-year 
delay.  The estimates can also be used to calculate the discount factor, or similarly the 
implied rate of interest.  Consider the general case of an n year delay, for n = 2, 4, and 6.  
Since 
                                                 
11 All estimates are based on the STATA conditional (fixed-effect) logit estimates.  The fixed effects are for 
the different conjoint question sets. 
 11 
 n
n  , (7) 
the value of δ is given by 
   nn
/1
/1  . (8) 
The substantial influence of early delays is reflected in the estimated rates of time 
preference, which are summarized in the top panel of Table 2.  For a two-year delay, 
respondents exhibit a 14.3 percent rate of interest.  The utility loss associated with a four-
year delay is very similar to that of a two-year delay, with the consequence being that the 
average rate of time preference is 8.4 percent.  For the six-year delay, the average implied 
rate of interest over that period is 8.7 percent, which is also well below the initial value of 
14.3 percent. 
The value of δ given by equation 8 is a nonlinear function of the parameters λ and 
ξn.  It is nevertheless feasible to construct 95 percent confidence intervals for δ, which are 
(0.86, 0.90) for a two-year delay, (0.91, 0.94) for a four-year delay, and (0.90, 0.94) for a 
six-year delay.  These estimates for δ in turn imply confidence intervals for the rates of 
time preference r, which in terms of interest rate percent, are (11.8, 17.0) for a two-year 
delay, (6.6, 10.4) for a four-year delay, and (6.7, 10.7) for a six-year delay.  Note that 
confidence intervals for the four-year and six-year delay are quite similar.  The distinctive 
confidence interval is for the two-year delay, which is reflective of respondents’ very 
different rate of time preference for the more immediate period of delay. 
 
2.3 Mixed Logit Model 
To explore the robustness of the conditional fixed-effects logit estimates, we also 
estimate the equations in Table 1 using a mixed logit model.  The mixed logit model 
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generalizes the conditional logit model on several dimensions.  First, it does not require 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption of the conditional logit 
framework.  Second, rather than assuming homogeneous preferences and estimating a 
single parameter for each variable, the mixed logit model yields estimates of the mean 
and variance of the individual level parameters, thus providing information on the extent 
of individual variation in the coefficient estimates.  Third, the estimation approach we use 
takes into account unobserved factors that will affect particular policy choices by the 
respondent, leading to possibly correlated errors across the repeated choices.  The utility 
of person n of policy i in choice set k for the analog of equation 4 is 
 niknikniknniknniknniknnik twtwcu  . (9) 
Note that compared to the parameter estimates in equation 4 above, the values of α, β, γ, 
and θ are now permitted to vary across individuals in the sample.  However, for each of 
the five choice sets, the values of αn, λn, γn, and θn are required to be the same across the 
choices for the particular individual.   
The particular estimation approach used is the hierarchical Bayes estimation 
procedure, which shares the same behavioral model as does the mixed logit model and 
yields estimates virtually equivalent to mixed logit.12  The coefficient vector is assumed 
to be independent of the stochastic   and non-stochastic c, w, and t.  
                                                 
12 For discussion of the properties of hierarchical Bayes estimates, see Huber and Train (2001) and Train 
(2003).  The hierarchical Bayesian estimation procedure assumes that each individual’s parameters can be 
estimated by a mixture of the aggregate distribution of values with choices that the respondent makes.  The 
mixed logit estimation approach assumes that the parameter vector is normally distributed with mean b and 
covariance W, and the error term nik  is iid extreme value.  The hierarchical Bayes procedure treats b and 
W as stochastic.  Both procedures use simulation methods to derive their estimates.  The approach takes as 
its prior estimate of the parameters coefficient values that account for the derived heterogeneity across 
respondents and the individual’s choices.  Combining the prior with the likelihood function for the data 
yields the posterior distribution.  Gibbs sampling is then used to take repeated measures of b and W from 
the posterior distribution.  Draws are repeated until the conditional posterior estimates converge.  As shown 
in Huber and Train (2001), the hierarchical Bayes estimates are virtually equivalent to those yielded by 
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The estimates in the second column of Table 1 present the mean value of the 
estimated coefficients across the sample as well as the standard deviation of the 
individual coefficients’ values.  The various coefficients associated with the delay terms 
have associated standard deviations that are fairly large relative to the means, indicating 
quite substantial heterogeneity in rates of discount across respondents. 
The mean values of the mixed logit parameters indicate tradeoff rates that closely 
parallel the conditional logit results.  Because the utility scale is invariant with respect to 
a positive linear transformation, it is the coefficient ratios and relative coefficient values 
that are most instructive.   
The similarity of the conditional logit and mixed logit estimates is apparent in 
Figure 2, which illustrates the discount factors for improvements occurring with different 
periods of delay based on a continuous, quadratic time delay formulation in Table A3.  
For the first three years of delay, the discount factors are almost identical for the 
conditional fixed-effects logit and mixed logit estimates.  Thereafter the discount factor 
implied by the mixed logit estimates becomes increasingly greater than that implied by 
the conditional logit model, which reflects the somewhat lower average rate of time 
preference implied by the mixed logit results.  
 
2.4 Average and Marginal Rates of Time Preference  
The bottom panel of Table 3 summarizes the average rate of interest implied by 
this set of mixed logit estimates, which are 12.7 percent for a two-year delay, 8.0 percent 
                                                                                                                                                 
classical maximum likelihood mixed logit approaches.  The mean and variance of the Bayesian estimator 
are asymptotically equivalent to the classical maximum likelihood estimates.  Moreover, the hierarchical 
Bayes estimation is less subject to problems of identification. 
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for a four-year delay, and 7.9 percent for a six-year delay.  This pattern accords with the 
hyperbolic discounting model in that there is a very high initial rate of discount followed 
by a decline and comparative flattening of the rate of time preference.  Unlike the 
conditional logit results, there is no minor increase in the point estimate of the average 
rate of time preference with a six-year delay.   
The unusual pattern of discounting associated with these results can be illustrated 
by examining the term structure of the implied rates of interest.  Let rfg be the implied 
annual rate of time preference for the time period extending from period f to period g.  
Consider the estimates using the time delay interval variables for both the conditional 
logit and mixed logit models.  The first column of Table 3 summarizes the pattern of 
discount factors g0 which equals δn for an n-period delay.  Column 2 summarizes the 
average rates of time preference r0g .  The substantial weight placed on initial payoffs and 
the decline in average rates of time preference are inconsistent with the standard 
exponential discounting model.  The steepness of the decline in rates of time preference 
after the initial period generates an additional anomaly in the discounting pattern.   
Following the literature on term structure of interest rates, one can calculate the 
marginal discount rate for each two-year period.  For the first two-year period, the 
average rate of time preference and the marginal two-year rate of time preference are 
14.3 percent for the conditional logit estimates.  The marginal value of the rate of time 
preference over the period extending from period 2 to period 4 for the conditional logit 
model is the value of r24 that satisfies 
      224
24
r1143.01084.01  , (10) 
or r24 = 2.8 percent.  Table 3 also reports the marginal rates of time preference for the six-
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year time delay for the conditional logit results as well as parallel results for the mixed 
logit estimates.  For each set of estimates, the results display a common general pattern.  
Because the high average rate of interest over different periods of delay exhibits a sharp 
decline and then remains relatively flat, the marginal rate of time preference drops 
substantially and then increases. To achieve the great drop in the average rate of time 
preference for four years of delay, the marginal rate must drop considerably.  However, 
because the average rate of time preference declines for a six-year delay but not greatly, 
the marginal rate of time preference subsequently rises.  For both the conditional logit 
results and mixed logit results, there is an intriguing pattern for marginal rates of time 
preference which start at a very high level, drop substantially, and then increase. 
The pattern of discount factors associated with a g year delay, which is denoted 
by g0 , also is anomalous.  Based on the empirical structure of the model, 00  is set equal 
to 1.0.  As shown in Table 3, under the exponential discounting case, the value of 02 = 
0.77 for the conditional logit model and 0.79 for the mixed logit should be the square of 
their respective average annual discount factors of 0.88 and 0.89.  Similarly, if 04 = 0.72 
(conditional logit) or 0.74 (mixed logit), then the associated constant annual value of   is 
given by 0.92 (conditional logit) and 0.93 (mixed logit).  These discount factors are 
above the annual value for the initial two-year delay.  Finally, for 06 = 0.61 (conditional 
logit) and 0.63 (mixed logit), the implied annual value of   assuming exponential 
discounting is 0.92 (conditional logit) and 0.93 (mixed logit).  The implied annual 
discount factor assuming exponential discounting begins at a low level, then rises and 
flattens out.  The increase then the flattening in the annual discount factor generates a 
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fairly steady decline in the average total discount factor and a more jagged pattern in the 
marginal rate of time preference. 
 
3.  The Hyperbolic Discounting Parameter β 
The analysis thus far has presented estimates of annual discount factors based on 
the exponential discounting framework.  It is clear from the observed discount rate 
pattern that the results are inconsistent with this formulation and have the general 
characteristics associated with the hyperbolic discounting model.  If we recast the results 
in the hyperbolic discounting framework, it is possible to generate estimates of the 
hyperbolic discount rate parameter β that governs the extent of the departure from 
exponential discounting. 
First, consider the implications of the conditional logit results.  The utility of a 
one unit improvement with a two-year delay is  4322 1  w , which is 0.114 
based on the coefficient estimates.  Similarly, the utility of a unit improvement with a 
four-year delay is ]1[ 4324  w , which is 0.107.  The ratio of these utilities is 
δ2, which produces an estimate of δ of 0.969.  Taking the ratio of the zero delay utility to 
the utility after a two-year delay produces 
 
 
 4322
432
1w
1w
114.0
148.0


 . (11)  
After substituting for the value of δ of 0.969, equation 11 yields a value of β of 0.48.13 
                                                 
13 This calculation assumes that respondents processed the five year period of water quality improvements, 
which appears twice in the survey text in Figure 1.  Post-survey debriefings of respondents revealed no 
evidence of misunderstanding of the length of the period of improvement and did indicate explicit 
awareness of the length of the period. 
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Analogously, one could have used the estimate of δ implied by the ratio of the 
six-year delayed improvement to the two-year delay.  Because of the change in rates of 
time preference over time, this approach yields a somewhat different estimate of δ of 
0.943, which implies a value of β of 0.58. 
One can generate similar estimates based on the mixed logit results.  Using the 
two-year and four-year delay results we generate a value of δ of 0.967 and a value of β of 
0.53.  With the six-year versus two-year delay as the initial contrast, δ = 0.948 and β = 
0.61.  The final column of Table 3 summarizes these results. 
Both the conditional logit and mixed logit estimates reflect a similar pattern, with 
β ranging from 0.48 to 0.61, with the higher values derived from the δ values based on 
the longer periods of delay.14  In each case, however, the discrepancy between the values 
of β and 1.0 serves as a measure of the extent of departure from the exponential 
discounting model.  
 
4. Water Recreational Visitor Status and Discounting Anomalies 
The analysis thus far has abstracted from differences in the preferences among the 
sample population, estimating average values across the entire sample.  As the mixed 
logit estimates demonstrated, there is considerable heterogeneity in the value of water 
quality and rates of time preference.  In this section we examine a chief source of this 
heterogeneity based on whether the respondent visits lakes, rivers, and streams for 
recreational purposes.  
                                                 
14 For interesting results regarding market choices and a review of estimates of the hyperbolic discounting 
parameter, which are in the 0.5 to 0.8 range, see DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006). 
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A considerable environmental literature has grappled with the use/nonuse 
distinction in the valuation of environmental goods.15  One would certainly expect 
visitors to water bodies to express a higher unit benefit value for water quality 
improvements than those who do not visit.  Our emphasis is quite different in that our 
fundamental concern is with how rates of time preference differ among population groups 
depending on their water quality visitor status. How benefit values are affected by the 
timing of the improvements is hardly clear-cut.  Because visitors will benefit directly and 
immediately from water quality improvements, one might hypothesize that visitors will 
have higher rates of time preference with respect to these improvements.  Alternatively, 
the visitors’ valuations of water quality improvement may not decline substantially with 
delays, because their greater long-term commitment to the improved water will make 
them more willing to be patient with respect to the timing of the improvement. 
The intertemporal rationality of choices may also differ by visitor status.  Two 
competing effects are at work.  Those who have visited lakes or rivers more recently have 
more experience with the good and should be expected to have given more thought to 
their valuations of water quality improvements at different points in time.  As a 
consequence, their valuations should more closely accord with principles of economic 
rationality to the extent that such direct experience with the commodity being valued 
leads to improved economic properties of choices.  A countervailing influence is that 
visitors to lakes and rivers may have become more emotionally attached to the good.  As 
                                                 
15 These explorations have also sought to explore related issues such as option values and different forms of 
passive use.  See, among others, Smith (1987), Bishop and Welsh (1992), Smith and Osborne (1996), and 
Carson, Flores, and Mitchell (1999).  We will have a narrower empirical distinction based on water body 
visits in the past year.  
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Loewenstein (2000) has hypothesized, the presence of an affective response may induce 
apparently irrational economic behavior. 
Table 4 reports results for different samples based on water body visitor status, 
where these equations include the main effect of delay and water quality improvement as 
well as their interaction.  Recreation visitors consist of those respondents who have 
visited lakes, rivers, or streams in the past year.  To explore how the rate of time 
preference may change with the extent of delay, we use a flexible model in which there is 
a separate interaction for each of the three different periods of delay included in the 
survey.   
As one might expect, water body visitors have a higher benefit value for water 
quality than those who do not visit.  The marginal benefits for a one percent improvement 
in the amount of water rated “Good” in one’s region is $23.02 for the full sample, $24.72 
for the sample who visit lakes or rivers, and $19.04 for those who do not visit.  Consistent 
with our hypothesis, those who visit lakes or rivers have a higher value.  More 
specifically, the visits subsample has a valuation with a 95% confidence interval of 
($23.68, $25.74), as compared to ($17.80, $20.53) for those who have not visited lakes or 
rivers in the past 12 months.16  It is especially noteworthy that the valuations for those 
who do not visit lakes or rivers are still reasonably high and are about three-fourths of the 
size of the valuations of those who have visited lakes or rivers in the past year.  These 
differences can be traced to differences in the water quality utilities, as the cost 
disutilities are virtually identical for the two subsamples.  
Delay has a negative disutility for each of the three sets of estimates.  That this 
disutility value is considerably smaller when the delay-water quality improvement 
                                                 
16 The 95% confidence interval for the full sample valuation is ($22.19, $23.85).  
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interactions are included is not surprising.  The direct disutility of delay is much lower for 
the no visits subsample than for the visits subsample. These results indicate that the visits 
subsample dislikes delays per se in addition to disliking the delayed value of 
improvement.   
Visitors have a surprisingly flat pattern of coefficients for the interactive effect of 
delays and improvement. Their relatively low discount rate implies that they both value 
immediate improvement and are willing to wait for improvements.   Indeed, the point 
estimates for the Delay 4 interaction are of smaller magnitude than for the Delay 2 
interaction.  The increasingly negative coefficient pattern of the delay and improvement 
interactions for the no visits subsample is more in line with what one would expect based 
on conventional exponential discounting models.   
The bottom two panels of Table 2 summarize the discount rates results for each of 
the sets of estimates and for each different period of time delay.  The visits subsample has 
much lower rates of time preference than does the no visits subsample.  Whereas the 
visits subsample has rates of time preference in a fairly reasonable range of 5-10 percent, 
the estimates for the no visits subsample are in the 17-23 percent range, implying 
considerable discounting of deferred environmental improvements.  The no visits 
subsample has both a higher level of initial desire for water quality and greater patience 
for awaiting the improvements.  For both the full sample and the no visits subsample, the 
confidence interval for the discount factors for the 0-2 year period does not overlap with 
that for longer periods of delay, which is consistent with hyperbolic discounting.  
However, there is substantial overlap for the visits subsample, as is consistent with 
exponential discounting.  For the visitors subsample, the rate of time preference is just 
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below 11 percent for the two year delay but is in the 5-6 percent range thereafter.  This 
emphasis on more immediate rewards followed by a discontinuous drop in the rate of 
time preference that remains steady thereafter is quite consistent with models of 
hyperbolic discounting.  The no visits subsample does not exhibit this pattern.  
To explore the influence of personal characteristics on valuations, Table 5 reports 
results for which each of the main effects is interacted with a full set of demographic 
variables.  In addition to the usual measures pertaining to age, race, gender, education (in 
years), and income (in thousands of dollars), we also include an environmental group 
member variable and a lake acres per state square mile variable, each of which should be 
positively related to valuations.  The full sample equation also includes a final set of 
interactions for whether the respondent visited a lake or river in the past 12 months.  The 
main effects in the results in Table 5 exhibit the same general pattern as in the previous 
estimates.   
The first set of personal characteristic interactions is with the cost of the policy, 
which has a negative effect on utility in its main effect so that negative interaction terms 
imply greater cost disutility and positive interaction terms imply less cost disutility.  The 
only interaction that is statistically significant for the no visits subsample is that for 
environmental group members, who have a positive interaction effect.  Those who do not 
visit lakes or rivers but who nevertheless belong to a major environmental organization 
experience less of a loss in utility from increases in the cost of water quality 
improvements, as one might expect.  For the sample that visited lakes or rivers in the past 
year, there is less of a utility loss from policy costs for respondents who are older, have 
higher income, or are members of an environmental group.  The one consistent pattern in 
 22 
all three sets of cost interaction estimates is that members of environmental groups 
experience less of a drop in utility due to higher costs.  In the full sample regression, 
respondents who are black, female, or who have higher income also suffer less of a 
decline in utility due to policy costs.  For the full sample regressions, there is no 
statistically significant effect on the disutility of costs for those who have visited a lake or 
river in the past twelve months. 
That is not the case for water quality improvements, as people who have visited 
lakes or rivers have a higher utility value for improvements.  Thus, the difference in the 
tradeoff rate of costs and improvements for the visits subsample as compared to the no 
visits subsample stems from their different valuation of improvements rather than 
differences in the disutility of costs.  Water quality improvements have fairly 
homogeneous utility values throughout the no visits population, as none of the interaction 
terms is statistically significant for this group.  However, for both the visits sample and 
the full sample, there is a negative effect of age and for black respondents, as well as a 
positive effect of education.  Older respondents generally tend to have a shorter time 
horizon for valuing environmental improvements, and black respondents tend to have 
much lower usage rates for lakes and rivers than white respondents in our sample, and 
this influence may reflect their lower intensity of use even if they have visited a lake or 
river in the past year.  More highly educated respondents, who tend to have greater 
lifetime wealth, value improvements more highly, which is consistent with water quality 
being a normal good.   
The next set of interactions pertains to the effect of delay.  The visits group of 
respondents displays a greater concern with delay than the no visits group.  For each of 
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the three columns of estimates, older respondents are more averse to delay, which is 
reflective of their shorter time horizon.  Environmental group members also experience 
greater utility loss from delay in the visits subsample.  A striking result is the large 
negative effect for respondents who are black for all three sets of estimates.  While black 
respondents constitute a small segment of our visits subsample, the lower sensitivity to 
cost and greater sensitivity to delay may reflect substantial value placed on immediate 
policy implementation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The choice-based conjoint results provide insight into both the level of valuations 
of water quality and how these values are affected by delays.  The respondents to the 
representative national stated preference survey exhibited many reasonable patterns of 
behavior.  They prefer higher levels of water quality to less and lower cost levels to 
higher costs.  They are also willing to trade off these dimensions now for greater 
improvements in the future.  
The main anomaly that was identified pertained to the temporal structure of 
discount rates.  The full sample exhibited high rates of discount when evaluating 
immediate improvements, where the discount rate declined and became stable.  This 
pattern is consistent with hyperbolic discounting but not exponential discounting. A 
particularly striking implication of the discount rate results is that marginal discount rates 
start out very high, drop precipitously, and then return to a more intermediate level.  
Interestingly, there is a stark contrast between those who visit lakes and rivers for 
recreational purposes and those who do not.  Those who do not visit lakes or rivers place 
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a lower value on water quality generally but also have a consistently high rate of time 
preference on the order of 17-23 percent.  Given that many environmental amenities have 
long-term implications, it is quite interesting that the non-visitor sample who exhibit very 
large rates of time preference also place little value on immediate environmental 
improvements.  Although it is not clear that there is a causal linkage, we would offer the 
conjecture that people who generally have little concern with the future simply don’t 
place great value on environmental amenities, irrespective of when the improvements are 
occurring. 
Visitors to lakes and rivers value water quality more highly and are also more 
willing to tolerate delays in water quality improvements, with discount rates in the 5-10 
percent range.  However, unlike non-visitors, the visitors exhibit a statistically significant 
pattern of hyperbolic discounting, thus displaying a greater intertemporal preference for 
immediate improvements that is not consistent with exponential discounting.  Although 
the causal mechanism is not clear, such a pattern conceivably could be due to a greater 
affective response to water quality on the part of visitors.   
Although the presence of hyperbolic discounting is an interesting empirical 
curiosity, its main effect will be to disadvantage short-term environmental policies.  In 
terms of the average discount factor applied to policies, it is only the initial effects that 
receive an inordinately high weight.  The average discount factor thereafter is quite 
stable.  If such a pattern persists with respect to very long-term payoff streams such as 
those associated with climate change policies, the influence of the initial hyperbolic 
discounting anomaly will be negligible.  What is of greater consequence is that those who 
do not visit lakes or rivers have consistently high rates of time preference and place a 
 25 
very low value on future economic improvements.  This segment of the population will 
provide little support for environmental policies that generate benefits either now or in 
the future.   
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Appendix: Scope and Sensitivity Tests 
 
The first set of empirical estimates to be explored is the basic model that includes 
only main effects.  These estimates are informative in confirming that higher cost levels 
and longer delays are negatively valued and larger improvements are positively valued, 
as required for the scope test.   
Table A2 presents two sets of regression estimates of equation 3 for two different 
samples, where the first sample considers the responses only to the initial conjoint 
question and the full sample includes five observations per respondent.  The conditional 
logit estimates for Question 1 include only a single observation for each respondent and 
thus constitute a more rigorous across-subjects scope test.  Put differently, the 
coefficients indicate if the person in the first choice is appropriately sensitive to the three 
parameters.   The coefficients have the expected signs with more water quality 
improvements raising the probability that the alternative is chosen, whereas there is a 
negative effect of both delay and cost.  The magnitudes of the effects are very similar for 
both Question 1 and the full sample.  In each case, all coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 99 percent level, two-tailed test.  Table A2 reports a second set of 
regression estimates for each of the two samples using the discrete form of each of the 
policy choice variables by creating dummy variables for three of the four possible 
variable values.  In addition to exhibiting the hypothesized signs, the magnitudes of the 
variables follow the expected pattern, as larger water quality improvements are 
increasingly valued and longer delays and higher cost levels become increasingly 
unattractive. 
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These results can also be used to derive the willingness to pay for water quality.  
Taking the total derivative of utility and setting it equal to zero yields 
 0dtdwdcdu  . (12) 
The marginal value of each unit increase in water quality is given by the marginal rate of 
substitution between c and w, or 
 





w
c
, (13) 
which is $24.96 for the Question 1 estimates and $23.17 for the full sample.17  Because 
our interest in the Question 1 sample is only from the standpoint of an across-subjects 
scope test, the subsequent analysis focuses on the full sample. 
To calculate the rate of discount implied by these results, consider the overall 
tradeoff between improvement and delay.  This marginal tradeoff rate is given by  
 





t
w
, (14) 
which is 2.235 for the Question 1 estimates and 2.186 for the full sample.  For the 
midpoint survey water quality improvement level of 12.5 percent, the equivalent water 
quality with one year of delay based on the full sample estimates satisfies 
 
r1
186.25.12
5.12


 , (15) 
where solving for r yields an average value of r of 17.49 percent.  The analogous result 
for the Question 1 responses is 17.88 percent.  These estimates of the discount rate are 
drawn from an oversimplified model that does not permit possible interactions between 
time delays and improvements. 
                                                 
17 These values are very similar to the estimates generated with a different survey methodology reported in 
Viscusi, Huber, and Bell (2008). 
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Although respondents may have preferences regarding policy delays generally, 
the main matter of interest is how delays affect their valuation of water quality 
improvements and what rates of discount are implied by these preferences.  The first set 
of estimates in Table A3 adds a Delay x Improvement interaction term to the main effects 
equation.  The utility gain associated with water quality improvements should be smaller 
for longer delays t, and the empirical estimates yield the expected negative effect of the 
interaction of time delay and water quality improvement.  Whereas one unit of immediate 
water quality improvement has a value of 0.1438, the value of an improvement that 
occurs after one year is (0.1438 – 0.0086) = 0.1352, dropping to (0.1438 - 6 x 0.0086) = 
0.0922 by year 6.  This simple interaction constrains the effect of delay to be a constant 
value of improvement irrespective of the extent of delay.18 
To provide a more realistic picture of how the length of delay affects the discount 
rate, the second equation estimated in Table A3 includes a quadratic delay interaction 
with improvement.  This specification permits there to be nonlinearity in the influence of 
delay on the valuation of improvements, leading to 
 
2
nini2nini1nininini twtwtwcu  . (16) 
The value of θ1 is negative, and θ2 is positive, indicating a diminishing effect of delay on 
the utility of improvements. 
The quadratic specification generates the temporal pattern of discounting that is 
consistent with the hyperbolic discounting model.  A one-year delay has an associated 
rate of time preference of 10.6 percent.  This average rate of time preference declines to 
                                                 
18 As a result, the marginal effect of long delays on the implied rate of time preference is greater for long 
delays than for short delays.  The implied average rate of discount is 6.4 percent for a one period delay, 6.7 
percent for the midpoint delay value of three years, and 7.7 percent for the upper bound delay period of six 
years.  This rising pattern of rates of time preference is the opposite of the hyperbolic discounting pattern, 
but derives as a consequence of the constraints imposed on the estimation. 
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10.4 percent for two years, 10.0 percent at the midpoint delay value of three years, 9.7 
percent for four years, 9.2 percent for five years, and 8.5 percent for six years.  Though 
these rates of time preference seem high relative to the cost of capital and discount rates 
used by the government, these estimates are in a more reasonable range than have been 
found in many studies of real world choices in product markets and the labor market.19   
 
                                                 
19 Some discount rates have been estimated to be 30 percent or more.  Past analyses include the implied 
discount rates based on appliance energy efficiency decisions, used car purchases, and decisions involving 
risky jobs.  Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) provide a review. 
 33 
Table A1 
Comparison of Sample to the National Adult Populationa 
 
Demographic Variable Survey Participants  
(n=2,914) 
US Adult Population 
 Percent Percent 
Employment Status (16 years or older)   
       Employed 60.4 62.3 
   
Age   
       18 - 24 years old 13.6 13.3 
       25 - 34 years old 20.5 18.3 
       35 - 44 years old 19.2 20.4 
       45 - 54 years old 18.4 18.7 
       55 - 64 years old 11.9 12.2 
       64 - 74 years old 11.8 8.4 
       75 years old or older 4.6 8.1 
   
Educational Attainment   
       Less than HS 18.8 15.4 
       HS Diploma or higher 59.3 57.4 
       Bachelor or higher 21.8 27.2 
   
Race / Ethnicity   
        White 80.0 81.9 
        Black/African-American 13.3 11.8 
        American Indian or Alaska Native 1.8 0.9 
        Asian/Pacific Islander/Other 4.8 5.5 
   
   
Race / Ethnicity of Household   
       Hispanic 10.2 12.1 
   
Gender   
       Male 50.7 48.5 
       Female 49.3 51.5 
   
Marital Status   
       Married 56.5 58.8 
       Single (never married) 26.5 24.4 
       Divorced 11.7 10.2 
       Widowed 5.3 6.6 
   
Household Income (2002)   
       Less than $15,000 15.6 16.1 
       $15,000 to $24,999 11.7 13.2 
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       $25,000 to $34,999 12.1 12.3 
       $35,000 to $49,999 18.8 15.1 
       $50,000 to $74,999 17.3 18.3 
       $75,000 or more 24.5 25.1 
 
a Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2004-5.  2003 adult population (18 years+), 
unless otherwise noted. 
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Table A2 
Conditional Logit Estimates of Policy Choice, Scope Test 
 
 Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Variable Question 1 Full Sample 
     
Water Quality Improvement 10 -- 0.8859*** 
(0.0890) 
-- 0.8545*** 
(0.0352) 
Water Quality Improvement 15 -- 1.2765*** 
(0.1282) 
-- 1.1397*** 
(0.0503) 
Water Quality Improvement 20 -- 1.9108*** 
(0.1168) 
-- 1.8535*** 
(0.0428) 
Water Quality Improvement 0.1348*** 
(0.0055) 
-- 0.1205*** 
(0.0022) 
-- 
Delay 2 Years -- -1.0424*** 
(0.0876) 
-- -0.7511*** 
(0.0293) 
Delay 4 Years -- -1.0745*** 
(0.0981) 
-- -1.0112*** 
(0.0280) 
Delay 6 Years -- -1.6196*** 
(0.1485) 
-- -1.5486*** 
(0.0403) 
Delay -0.3013*** 
(0.0135) 
-- -0.2634*** 
(0.0052) 
-- 
Cost 200 -- -0.5374*** 
(0.0996) 
-- -0.5322*** 
(0.0280) 
Cost 300 -- -1.0231*** 
(0.0769) 
-- -1.0814*** 
(0.0285) 
Cost 400 -- -1.4639*** 
(0.1144) 
-- -1.4381*** 
(0.0399) 
Cost -0.0054*** 
(0.0003) 
-- -0.0052*** 
(0.0001) 
-- 
***Coefficient is statistically significant at the 99 percent level, two-tailed test. 
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Table A3 
Conditional Logit and Mixed Logit Sensitivity Tests 
 
Variable Conditional Logit Coefficient 
(Std. Error)  
Mixed Logit Coefficient 
(Std. Deviation) 
     
Water Quality Improvement 0.1438*** 
(0.0035) 
0.1472*** 
(0.0036) 
0.2236 
(0.1385) 
0.2169 
(0.1496) 
Delay -0.1497*** 
(0.0141) 
-0.1339*** 
(0.0143) 
-0.5015 
(0.3781) 
-0.5944 
(0.5623) 
Cost -0.0054*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0053*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0098 
(0.0067) 
-0.0103 
(0.0072) 
Delay x Improvement -0.0086*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0147*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0133 
(0.0210) 
-0.0235 
(0.0253) 
(Delay)2 x Improvement -- 0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
-- 0.0021 
(0.0065) 
 
***Coefficient is statistically significant at the 99 percent level, two-tailed test. 
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Figure 1 
Water Quality Survey Policy Choicea 
 
Imagine again that you have recently moved to another region of the country, where 
water quality is 50% Good. 
 
Imagine that the government is considering several policies that would temporarily 
increase water quality in your region.  Once the policy is in effect, the improvement lasts 
for five years, then water quality returns to its previous level.  Regardless of when the 
improvement begins, the cost of each begins immediately and continues for five years. 
 
Which of the three policies below would you most prefer? 
    
 Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
    
Year When Improvement 
Begins 
Now 2 Years From 
Now 
4 Years From 
Now 
    
Amount of Water 
Improvement 
5% 10% 15% 
    
Cost of Policy Per Year $100 $200 $300 
    
Which Policy Would You 
Prefer 
Policy 1 
* 
Policy 2 
* 
Policy 3 
* 
 
 
a The survey included the following policy variations—Amount of Water Quality 
Improvement: 5%, 10%, 15%, or 20%; Cost of Policy: $100, $200, $300, or $400; 
Timing of Improvement: Now, 2 Years From Now, 4 Years From Now, and 6 Years 
From Now. 
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Figure 2 
Discount Factors Predicted by Quadratic Delay Specification 
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Table 1  
Conditional Logit and Mixed Logit Estimates of Policy Choice 
 
 
Variable Conditional Logit 
Coefficient (Std. Error)  
Mixed Logit Coefficient 
(Std. Deviation) 
   
Water Quality Improvement 0.1483*** 
(0.0036) 
0.3098 
(0.1605) 
Delay -0.1337*** 
(0.0144) 
-0.3387 
(0.3336) 
Cost -0.0053*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0111 
(0.0086) 
Delay 2 Years x Improvement -0.0348*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0657 
(0.0603) 
Delay 4 Years x Improvement -0.0410*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0818 
(0.0658) 
Delay 6 Years x Improvement -0.0583*** 
(0.0061) 
-0.1131 
(0.0816) 
 
***Coefficient is statistically significant at the 99 percent level, two-tailed test. 
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Table 2 
95% Confidence Intervals for Discount Factors and Rates of Time Preference 
 
 
 Discount Factor Rate of Time Preference 
 
Period of Delay 
 
  
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 
r (%) 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Full Sample:      
0-2 Years 0.875 (0.855, 0.895) 14.32 (11.79, 16.97) 
2-4 Years 0.922 (0.906, 0.938) 8.42 (6.56, 10.35) 
4-6 Years 0.920 (0.903, 0.937) 8.70 (6.75, 10.71) 
     
Visits to Lakes and  
Rivers: 
    
0-2 Years 0.902 (0.878, 0.926) 10.84 (7.99, 13.84) 
2-4 Years 0.952 (0.933, 0.970) 5.10 (3.05, 7.22) 
4-6 Years 0.945 (0.926, 0.963) 5.83 (3.79, 7.97) 
     
No Visits to Lakes or 
Rivers: 
    
0-2 Years 0.814 (0.777, 0.850) 22.91 (17.61, 28.70) 
2-4 Years 0.848 (0.815, 0.881) 17.94 (13.51, 22.71) 
4-6 Years 0.854 (0.815, 0.894) 17.05 (11.92, 22.68) 
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 Table 3 
Average and Marginal Rates of Time Preference 
 
 Average Total 
Discount Factor  
Average Rates of 
Time Preference (%) 
Marginal Rates of 
Time Preference (%) 
Hyperbolic 
Parameter β* 
Time Period δ0g=δg rog rg-2,g  
     
Conditional Fixed Effect Logit Estimates:   
     
2 years 0.77 14.3 14.3 -- 
     
4 years 0.72 8.4 2.8 0.48 
     
6 years 0.61 8.7 9.3 0.58 
     
Mixed Logit Estimates:    
     
2 years 0.79 12.7 12.7 -- 
     
4 years 0.74 8.0 3.5 0.53 
     
6 years 0.63 7.9 7.7 0.61 
* These β values are calculated using the comparison of the estimates for the years 
indicated to the estimates for a delay of two years. 
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Table 4 
Conditional Logit Estimates with Delay-Improvement Interactionsa 
 
 
 Full Sample 
Visits to Lakes or 
Rivers 
No Visits to 
Lakes or Rivers 
Cost 
 
-0.0053 *** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0053 *** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0052 *** 
(0.0002) 
Water Quality 
Improvement 
0.1483 *** 
(0.0036) 
0.1513 *** 
(0.0045) 
0.1417 *** 
(0.0063) 
Delay 
 
-0.1337 *** 
(0.0144) 
-0.1780 *** 
(0.0178) 
-0.0498 ** 
(0.0245) 
Delay 2 years x  
Water Quality 
Improvement 
-0.0348 *** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0281 *** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0479 *** 
(0.0053) 
Delay 4 years x 
Water Quality 
Improvement 
-0.0410 *** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0273 *** 
(0.0056) 
-0.0684 *** 
(0.0078) 
Delay 6 years x  
Water Quality 
Improvement 
-0.0583 *** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0436 *** 
(0.0075) 
-0.0866 *** 
(0.0105) 
 
a Notes: ** Significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level; standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5 
Conditional Logit Estimates with Personal Characteristic Interactionsa  
 
 
Variable Set  Full Sample Visits to Lakes 
or Rivers 
No Visits to 
Lakes or Rivers 
Main Effects Cost -0.0053 *** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0053 *** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0052 *** 
(0.0002) 
Water Quality  
Improvements 
0.1214 *** 
(0.0022) 
0.1291 *** 
(0.0028) 
0.1020 *** 
(0.0039) 
Delay -0.2670 *** 
(0.0053) 
-0.2795 *** 
(0.0065) 
-0.2448 *** 
(0.0096) 
 
Cost 
Interactions 
Age 6.88e-6 
(6.29e-6) 
1.39e-5 * 
(7.87e-6) 
-4.58e-6 
(1.07e-5) 
Black 0.0006 * 
(0.0003) 
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
Female 0.0004 ** 
(0.0002) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
Education -5.14e-5 
(4.23e-5) 
-5.57e-5 
(5.17e-5) 
-4.67e-5 
(7.43e-5) 
Income  9.75e-6 *** 
(2.85e-6) 
1.29e-5 *** 
(3.55e-6) 
3.78e-6 
(4.87e-6) 
Environmental 
group member 
0.0014 *** 
(0.0005) 
0.0012 ** 
(0.0005) 
0.0019 * 
(0.0010) 
Lake acres per 
state square mile 
1.51e-5 
(1.16e-5) 
1.74e-5 
(1.43e-5) 
1.15e-5 
(1.98e-5) 
Visited a lake or 
river, last 12 
months 
-3.23e-5 
(0.0002) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
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Table 5 Continued 
 
Water 
Quality 
Improvement 
Interactions 
 Full Sample Visits to Lakes or 
Rivers 
No Visits to 
Lakes or Rivers 
Age -0.0003 ** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005 *** 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Black -0.0224 *** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0321 *** 
(0.0092) 
-0.0091 
(0.0088) 
Female -0.0039 
(0.0044) 
-0.0006 
(0.0055) 
-0.0109 
(0.0075) 
Education 0.0030 *** 
(0.0009) 
0.0037 *** 
(0.0011) 
0.0015 
(0.0015) 
Income  7.54e-5 
(6.03e-5) 
4.70e-5 
(7.53e-5) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Environmental 
group member 
0.0084 
(0.0100) 
0.0032 
(0.0113) 
0.0275 
(0.0218) 
Lake acres per 
state square mile 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
1.61e-5 
(0.0004) 
Visited a lake or 
river, last 12 
months 
0.0260 *** 
(0.0047) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
Delay 
Interactions 
Age -0.0022 *** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0018 *** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0028 *** 
(0.0005) 
Black -0.0728 *** 
(0.0159) 
-0.1032 *** 
(0.0233) 
-0.0476 ** 
(0.0222) 
Female -0.0150 
(0.0105) 
-0.0263 ** 
(0.0128) 
0.0075 
(0.0184) 
Education -0.0016 
(0.0021) 
-0.0035 
(0.0026) 
0.0025 
(0.0037) 
Income  1.57e-5 
(1.45e-5) 
0.0005 *** 
(0.0002) 
-4.51e-4 * 
(2.57e-4) 
Environmental 
group member 
-0.0339 
(0.0239) 
-0.0451 * 
(0.0271) 
-0.0043 
(0.0517) 
Lake acres per 
state square mile 
-0.0010 * 
(0.0006) 
-0.0010 
(0.0007) 
-0.0010 
(0.0010) 
Visited a lake or 
river, last 12 
months 
-0.0358 *** 
(0.0115) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
a Notes: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; and *** significant 
at the 0.01 level, two-tailed test.  All variables are zero centered.   
